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Sheriff or Prisoner?
The United States and the World Trade Organization
Paul B. Stephan*

O

ne might think that the recent fiasco in Seattle put an end to the claim that
globalization and U.S. hegemony amount to the same thing. The United States
advanced itself as the host of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") ministerial
meeting to identify the next round of global trade negotiations with U.S. objectives
and values, as well as to build the Clinton presidency's claim to a legacy. The refusal of
the participants to agree to an agenda for further negotiations, as much as the bizarre
street theater that hectored the delegates, proved a terrible embarrassment. The
institution most closely associated with open global markets has faltered, quite in
opposition to U.S. desires. If the United States cannot even set the topic of the
conversation, how can it be seen as dominating the world economic system?
Yet reports of the demise of U.S. dominance over the post-Cold War
international environment may be premature. The last decade has seen a remarkable
convergence in economic policies and expansion of the authority of institutions
designed to promote them. We still speak of a "Washington consensus" about the way
the international economy should work. Around the world politicians, intellectuals,
and workers alike decry the extent of U.S. influence, especially in economic matters.
Coca-Cola and McDonald's have come to stand for a particular kind of threat to
national self-determination, and those symbols ride on the back of the American

eagle.
To understand these claims about U.S. hegemony, we need some perspective. I
would like to compare two competing accounts of the U.S. role in the global economy.
In one version, the United States has built an international system that replicates its
ideology, culture and values. This is a unipolar world where a broad range of
fundamental choices about political and economic structure reflect Washington's
preferences. The United States may not make every meaningful decision in
administering the world economy, any more than the headquarters of a multinational
corporation dictates precisely what its local managers must do. But in this scenario,
the United States has final say on all questions that significantly affect its interests. I
will call this the hegemon story.
The contrasting account depicts the United States as a passive instrument
subject to forces outside its control. The identification of these forces varies, but often
they are seen as some combination of large multinational corporations and
Brown, Jr. Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. The author is grareful to Curtis
Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, Julian Ku, Paul Mahoney, John Setear and Joel Trachrman for comments
and criticism.
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international technocrats. The regime may advance some interests of the United
States, at least in the sense that it produces better outcomes than would genuine
international anarchy. But where the goals of the regime conflict with national
interest, the regime prevails. This I will call the regime story, because it asserts that
some broader regime limits U.S. action.
An essential component of these accounts is the perceived relationship between
the United States and the international institutions that help shape the world
economy. Those who see the United States as a hegemonic power portray the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the World Bank, the WTO, and similar
bodies as instruments of U.S. policy. Typical is the renowned historian Eric
Hobsbawm, who speaks of the IMF and the World Bank as "de facto subordinated to
US policy" and attributes the success of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") system "primarily to the overwhelming economic dominance of the USA
and of the dollar."1
In contrast to the hegemon story, the regime account sees these international
institutions as imposing significant constraints on what all nations can do, including
the world's only superpower. Whether the institutions determine their own agenda or
instead act as the instruments of private interests, they lay down and enforce rules that
the United States would not choose on its own. These perceptions complement other
stories depicting the "hollowing out" of the U.S. government. The broader image is of
a world where nation states, including the richest and most powerful of those entities,
play a diminished role.2
Our interest in the opposition of these stylized accounts goes beyond developing
a workable model of how international relations unfold. The competing stories have
different normative implications. A hegemonic perspective implies that one should
address the wrongs of the world-pollution, child labor, human rights abuses,
maldistribution of wealth-at the level of U.S. policy. But if regimes matter, then one
must confront those international forces and structures that produce these ills.
I believe that regimes count for a lot, and that U.S. hegemony has been greatly
overstated. There are many ways to advance this position, but I concentrate on one.
Since 1995 the WTO has made a dispute resolution process available to member
states. The first stage operates like conventional international arbitration before a
panel of experts, but with two salient differences. First, the obligation to submit to the
dispute resolution process comes bundled with WTO membership. Second, the
panels write doctrinal opinions that justify their decisions. Arguments based on legal
authority constrain what the panels can do, and other WTO decisions constitute legal
authority. The subsequent stage of WTO dispute resolution involves an Appellate
Body that operates, for all intents and purposes, like a common law appellate court
whose opinions both bind the parties and have precedential effect.
1. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991,274-75 (Pantheon 1994).
2. See, for example, John 0. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of
International Federalism, 18 Cardozo L Rev 903 (1996).
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After briefly outlining the WTO dispute resolution process, I look at three
WTO dispute resolution opinions involving the United States, two of which attacked
U.S. law and the third of which sought to vindicate the interests of U.S. producers
against Japanese trade barriers. I explore how these decisions both frustrate important
U.S. policies and make it more difficult for the United States to organize and
maintain a geopolitical hegemony. I then consider whether the apparent thwarting of
U.S. objectives in the three cases represents a real constraint on U.S. power and
influence. While acknowledging the difficulty of proving that any law-like norm
actually constrains a willful actor, I conclude by maintaining that the evidence that the
WTO exercises a capacity to displace Washington decision-making remains
suggestive if not fully persuasive.
I. THE WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS
In the popular consciousness, the WTO seems to have emerged fully formed,
cast up by the tide of privatization and capital flows that have swept over the world in
the last decade. The reality, of course, is more complex. The original GATT was
formed in a context of largely state-managed economics, where disputes would involve
challenges to the exercise of governmental regulatory endowments and would be
resolved through a process of bargaining that reflected respective power and the
availability of bargaining gains. Diplomats would negotiate these disputes as diplomats
had conducted themselves throughout history, seeking compromises of interests
rather than fulfillment of abstract normative principles.
Article XXIII of the GATT, the only provision to deal with dispute resolution
at all, ascribes to the GATT parties as a whole the power to take action against states
that undercut the Agreement. This Article neither specifies a procedure by which the
parties could act nor authorizes the delegation of this power to any lesser organ.
Despite the implication that dispute resolution would result from flexible deal-making
rather than through adjudication and sanctioning, GATT dispute resolution over
time took on the character of a disinterested tribunal interpreting rules and applying
them to controversial conduct. It became customary to appoint arbitration panels,
with respected experts in trade law proposing solutions that derived their authority
from the text of the GATT, past arbitral practice and principled arguments. The
parties institutionalized this custom in 1979, when, as part of the Tokyo Round
Agreements, they adopted a set of rules for forming arbitration panels and
determining their authority.3 The panel's reports, however, remained advisory,
because a recalcitrant government retained the authority to block indefinitely the
adoption of the recommendation. The panel reports, nonetheless influenced the
ultimate outcomes of these disputes, and often were adopted as authoritative
determinations of GATT obligations.
3. UnderstandingRegarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, 26S GATT BISD
210(1979).

Spring 2000

Chicago.JournalofInternationalLaw

As part of reconstituting the GATT organization as the WTO, the members
designed a new process for settling disputes over the content of GATT obligations.
The Agreement on Dispute Resolution, which went into effect in 1995, created a
standing Appellate Body to review panel decisions. The full WTO membership has
the authority to reverse the Appellate Body, but can do so only by consensus. In other
words, a permanent WTO organ now possesses the final power to interpret and apply
the Agreement, subject only to the unanimous disagreement of the membership, while
before a GATT panel could perform this function only with the unanimous support
of the membership.
This restructuring of dispute resolution may not have represented a radical break
with prior practice, but the change was significant. The creation of the Appellate
Body pushed the dispute resolution process further in the direction of legalization.
Because it has the authority to address all cases brought into the process, and because
its membership remains stable, the Appellate Body promotes consistency and
coherence. The Appellate Body also embraces a common law style, with opinions that
address interpretive issues in a manner that self-consciously incorporates both past
and anticipated opinions. Moreover, it has manifested a certain assertiveness with
respect to its institutional development. A gross indicator of the Appellate Body's
efforts to establish its authority is the frequency with which it has asserted WTO
rules against the members.4 Through 1999, it has found a country in violation of its
GATT obligations in twenty-two of the twenty-five cases it has resolved.' The panels
demonstrate the same assertiveness; in only two of the eight cases that have not been
reviewed did a panel uphold national law against a GATT challenge. 6
The accessibility of WTO dispute resolution to private interests furthers the
impression of a system that operates as an independent check on national power. In
form, the process seems closed to all but national governments. Only a WTO
member can seek a panel or take an appeal, and only states belong to the WTO. In
theory a state would bring a complaint only after assessing its overall national
interests. But the actual pattern of WTO disputes suggests that concentrated interest
4. For fiMU
information on the WTO dispute resolution process and the opinions that have resulted,
see the WTO website < http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm> (visited Mar 4, 2000).
5. In the remaining three cases, the Appellate Body dismissed a complaint on procedural grounds,
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Guatemala-Anti-DumpingInvestigation
Regarding PortlandCement from Mexico, para 89, WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov 2, 1998), upheld a panel
determination of no violation World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, BrazilMeasures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R (Feb 21, 1997), and reversed a panel
determination of violation World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, European
Communities-Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, para 98 WT/DS62, 67, 68/AB
(June 5, 1998). In one of the nineteen cases where it found a GATT violation, the Appellate Body
substantially broadened a panel determination that national law did not comply with the GATT.
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Canada-CertainMeasures Concerning
Periodicals,WT/DS31/AB/R (June 30, 1997).
6. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer
Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R (Mar 31, 1998); World Trade Organization, Report of
the Panel, UnitedStates-Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Dec 22, 1999).
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groups can recruit government support even in cases where their goals and general
welfare may not coincide. A good example is the banana dispute.7 The United States,
home of the corporate headquarters of the largest banana producers, attacked the
European import preferences for bananas grown in former colonies of EU members.
U.S. consumers had no direct stake in the dispute. But the interest of the producer
was strong enough to persuade the U.S. government to act on its behalf. Another
development favoring private involvement is the Appellate Body's procedure for
nongovernmental organizations-typically nonprofit activist groups, but the principle
applies equally to firms-to submit briefs and evidence, as long as a government acts
as a conduit." The way seems open to something like the U.S. system of public
litigation, which enables self-appointed watchdogs to challenge unwelcome laws,
subject mostly to a limitation on standing.
To summarize, the evolution of the GATT system and its transformation into
the WTO has created an international institution that, at least in form, has the
capacity to promote and enforce an international legal regime that might set limits on
U.S. hegemony. Whether it operates in such a manner as to restrict effectively the
influence of the United States over the world economy remains another matter. To
explore that question, I look at three instances where WTO dispute resolution has
impeded U.S. policies.
II. THREE CASES WHERE WASHINGTON LOST
I have selected these WTO cases for closer scrutiny, not because of their
representative nature, but rather because of their significance. I acknowledge the
shortcomings of this approach, which relies on my subjective assessment of the
importance of particular cases and does not document any systematic pattern in
WTO dispute resolution. I offer two arguments in its defense. First, we find ourselves
in the initial stage of institutional development, with only a small number of cases
actually resolved under the WTO structure. Thus the data remains too scant to
justify any genuinely systematic pronouncements. Second, during this early period in
the institution's history, it seems plausible that some actions may take on greater
importance than others. Only later events can validate which decisions cast the longest
shadows, but some informed speculation seems defensible.
InternationalEnvironmental Safeguards

A.

Whatever Seattle symbolizes, it was not the place where trade and environment
first came into conflict. Over the last decade scholars and pundits have devoted great
effort to untangling the tensions that exist between a liberal trade regime and optimal
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Regimefor the
Importation,Sale and Distributionof Bananas,WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept 9,1997).
8. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-ImportProhibition of
Certain Sbrinp and Shrimp Products,para 110, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct 12, 1998).
7.
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enforcement of environmental rules. Proponents of each offer an account of why the
other poses a threat to good policy. For free traders, rules that condition the
importation of goods on the source country's environmental practices serve the
forbidden end of protectionism. Rich country producers, unable to compete effectively
with poor countries that enjoy lower production costs, use environmental regulations
to bar the import of goods that consumers would prefer to buy. For environmentalists,
trade sanctions seem the only sensible means of enforcing rules that protect against
wasteful, but superficially attractive production methods. The alternative is a terrible
race to the bottom, as nations find themselves forced to relax their environmental
safeguards to preserve jobs and attract investment.
The WTO has confronted the issue of the over-harvesting of a common
resource in a case manifesting elements of domestic protection. Sea turtles are
endangered, and the use of traditional technologies in shrimp fishing results in
incidental kills of these creatures. The United States forbids the importation of
shrimp from countries that do not require the use of "turtle exclusion devices"
("TEDs") in shrimp nets. Sea turtles roam across national boundaries, so no one
country has the capacity to take sufficient measures to preserve them. The cost of
acquiring TEDs disproportionately raises the costs of fishermen from poor countries,
especially those who compete most directly with U.S. fishermen. The U.S. subsidizes
the acquisition ofTEDs for Caribbean fishermen but not those in the Gulf of Mexico.
Measures that seem designed to solve a collective action problem mix with those that
smack of protectionism.
Four South Asian countries attacked the U.S. legislation in the WTO. A panel
ruled that the United States unjustifiably discriminated among shrimp-producing
countries. The panel's opinion appeared to leave almost no room for unilateral efforts
to address environmental problems with a collective action character and provoked a
storm of criticism from the commentators. °
The Appellate Body upheld the panel's ultimate determination, but based its
decision on a narrower reading of the GATT that gave members more flexibility to
pursue solutions to collective action problems. There was, of course, no question that
the U.S. program treated shrimp imports differently depending on the country of
origin, a practice that Article I of the GATT presumptively forbids. The issue was
whether the extent of a country's compliance with U.S. environmental goals justified
these differences. The Appellate Body framed this question in terms of whether the
United States could fit its legislation within one of the provisions of Article XX,
which lists reasons for which a country may depart from its general GATT
9. A GATT panel had previously considered a similar issue. See United States-Restrictionson Imports
of Tuna, 39S GATT BISD 155 (1991). A vast commentary exists, the most comprehensive being

Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 83
Georgetown LJ 2131 (1995).
lo. World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998). See, for example, Robert Howse, The Turtles
Pane. Another Environmental Disasterin Geneva, 32J World Trade 73 (1998).
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obligations.
Interpreting the language of Article XX, the Appellate Body explained that a
member could use trade measures, including a selective ban on imports, to pursue
protection of a global commons, including preservation of an endangered species that
traveled across national boundaries. But Article XX contains a caveat, stipulating that
such measures are not to be "applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail...."" The Appellate Body concluded that the U.S. program had elements of
unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination. The U.S. did not take into account
different local conditions, refused to permit the importation of shrimp caught with
the approved technology if they came from the territory of countries that did not
require the use of that technology, did not extend the assistance that it rendered
Caribbean countries to other shrimp fishermen, and refused to permit countries
outside the Caribbean area to adopt gradually the turtle-protective measures it sought.
Moreover, the process for certifying countries as "turtle safe," and therefore eligible for
importation into the United States, had serious procedural shortcomings. The
Appellate Body concluded that the GATT "establishes certain minimum standards
for transparency and procedural fairness in the administration of trade regulations
which, in our view, are not met here." 2
Several aspects of this argument seem noteworthy. First, the Appellate Body, by
treating Article XX as extending to efforts to address collective action problems,
avoided an irreconcilable conflict between free-trade and environmental-protection
goals. This move in turn allowed the Appellate Body to position the WTO system as
offering both carrots and sticks to environmentally concerned governments. Those
countries that worked within the limits of the GATT, as interpreted by the Appellate
Body, could pursue their objectives while enjoying the benefits of WTO membership.
Those that went outside those boundaries would have to face retaliatory trade
sanctions. The broader message is that the WTO may be an attractive venue for
resolving trade-environment conflicts without giving carte blanche to
environmentalists.
Second, by insisting on a clear correspondence between the rules imposed on
each country and the professed environmental objective, the Appellate Body made it
more difficult for a government to use environmentally driven sanctions for other
purposes, and in particular for pursuing broad geopolitical objectives. The U.S. clearly
has reasons to foster a close relationship in the Caribbean countries, but these reasons
have nothing to do with saving turtles. The broader message is that the normal tools

ii.Sbrinp and Shrimp Products,para 39, WT/DS58/R.
12.

Id at para 183. Nor was this simply a matter of the rich nations imposing their will on poor
countries that depended on foreign markets for their revenue. In one case, the contemporary
consequences of which I review in the next section, the United States amended the Internal Revenue
Code in response to a panel determination that its system for taxing income from the sale of
exported goods violated the GATT rules against export subsidies.
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for maintaining a well-run hegemony may not be available if they otherwise run up
against GATT rules, as many economic incentives will.
Third, the Appellate Body seemed to suggest that the negotiation of incomplete
multilateral agreements might be worse than complete unilateralism. In addition to
entering into various instruments that dealt with protection of endangered species
generally (such as the Convention on Biological Diversity), the United States initiated
negotiations that led to the Inter-American Convention on the Protection and
Conservation of Sea Turtles, an agreement that directly addresses TEDs and shrimp
fishing. This pattern of interaction-where the United States worked out acceptable
arrangements with some, but made no attempt to negotiate comparable arrangements
with others-indicated to the Appellate Body that the U.S. had the capacity, but not
the desire, to reach accommodation with those it had excluded. This reasoning either
is perverse, in the sense that the perfect becomes the enemy of the good, or it indicates
a presumption against regional alliances. Again, the Appellate Body seemed to
disfavor the kind of coalition building on which an effective hegemony might rest.
Finally, the rejection of the U.S. certification scheme as procedurally deficient
suggests some interesting things about the Appellate Body's conception of the right to
import. U.S. doctrine, as is the case in most countries, regards the ability to move
goods across the national border as something entirely subject to governmental
control and capable of being withheld for any or no reason. 3 The Appellate Body, by
contrast, appears to regard importation as a kind of property right, which
governments may restrict only after undertaking an adversarial hearing. But if the
United States must submit to outside scrutiny of how it applies its trade laws, its
ability to intervene in particular transactions in response to its international interests
will be impaired. Once China joins the WTO, for example, would the United States
lose the ability to restrict imports as a means of reacting to human rights abuses or
aggression against Taiwan?
In short, the Appellate Body did not forbid the use of trade sanctions to advance
environmental ends, but it did contain that option. Its restrictions encumber an
environmentally minded government principally by making it difficult to bundle other
interests, such as regional security, immigration policy, or human rights, with
environmental concerns. These limitations make it harder for governments to
assemble domestic political coalitions to pursue environmental objectives, and they
frustrate efforts to use environmental measures to exercise international influence,
whether for environmental or other ends.
B.

CompetitionPolicy and Trade

In the abstract, trade and competition policy ought to work harmoniously
together. Liberal economic theory prescribes competition as a remedy for most ills,
13. See, for example, United States v Bozarov, 974 F2d 1037, 1044 (9rh Cir 1992) (exports); Arjay
Associates, Inc v Bush, 891 F2d 894,896 (Fed Cir 1989) (imports).
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which means combining tough rules against private anticompetitive behavior with the
renunciation of government restrictions on international commerce. Consumer
welfare serves as the touchstone for both policies.
But in reality, conflicts arise frequently. Much of trade policy involves decisions
to sacrifice consumer welfare for other goals, whether protecting influential producers
or pursuing economic development. Competition policy also will forego consumer
welfare for other ends, such as protecting "national champions" and preventing
industrial consolidation that would squeeze out politically influential small producers.
Moreover, the mechanism of competition policy varies considerably among developed
countries. The United States permits private class actions with pretrial discovery,
contingency-fee arrangements, and punitive damages. By contrast, most other
countries have little or no private enforcement, and such private suits as do exist lack
the plaintiff-generous attributes of the U.S. legal system.
The GATT came into being at a time when U.S. competition policy shaped the
international agenda. The conflict between the U.S. conception of good antitrust
policy and that of its erstwhile allies constituted one of the most salient international
economic policy disputes in the immediate postwar period. During World War II,
the U.S. Justice Department prosecuted several large multinational cartels. The other
industrial powers objected to U.S. assertion of a right to regulate offshore business
arrangements, as well as to the content of U.S. policy, and sought to put the issue of
competition policy on the agenda of the stillborn International Trade Organization.
The United States successfully resisted the submission of its competition practices to
any international organization's scrutiny. This standoff led to more than four decades
of sporadic conflict between U.S. antitrust enforcers and foreign governments.
One strand of this conflict involved the argument that anything less than fully
competitive conditions in a domestic market constitutes a trade barrier against foreign
producers. The United States at times embraced this position, largely in the belief
that only private trade barriers enjoying tacit government support could explain the
failure of U.S. producers to penetrate foreign markets. Guided by these convictions,
the U.S. government has threatened various unilateral actions, including bringing
antitrust suits and imposing trade sanctions under Section 301 of the Trade Act. 4
These actions have in common a determination by a U.S. organ-the courts in the
case of antitrust suits, the U.S. Trade Representative in the case of Section 301-that
the structure of a foreign economy constitutes a violation of a positive rule of
competition policy, whether U.S. antitrust law or international law.
But unilateral efforts to impose U.S. competition policy on other nations have

14.

On unilateral action generally, and the mechanics of Section 301 in particular, see Alan 0. Sykes,
Constructive UnilateralThreats in InternationalCommercial Relations: The Limited Casefor Section 301, L &
Pol in Ind Bus 263 (1992); Alan 0. Sykes, 'Mandatory" Retaliationfor Breach of Trade Agreements:
Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 BU Ind LJ 301 (1990); Paul B. Stephan, Creative
Destruction: Idiosyncratic Claims of International Law and the Helms-Burton Legislation, 27 Stetson L Rev
1341 (1998).
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met two obstacles. First, U.S. antitrust law does not purport to advance foreign
consumer welfare. The Sherman Act does not focus on the concerns that drive foreign
government protection of foreign markets, and U.S. producers can use it as a tool to
overcome such barriers only through a willful and innovative reinterpretation of the
statute. Second, a claim that nations have an obligation under international law to
restrict anticompetitive behavior in their domestic economies runs up against both
widespread practice to the contrary and the absence of any specific instrument spelling
out such an obligation. And any attempt by the United States to create such an
obligation through a naked assertion of power would run the risk of provoking
retaliation and upsetting the international arrangements currently in place, with which
the United States largely is satisfied.
With the advent of the new WTO dispute resolution process, the Clinton
Administration decided to give the U.S. contention about international competition
policy a multilateral dimension. It chose to take up the case of Eastman Kodak
("Kodak"), the world's largest purveyor of consumer photographic film and paper.
Kodak does not sell much of its products in Japan, a failure it attributes to a
conspiracy between Fuji Photo Film and Konica Corporation, its two Japanese
competitors, with the collusion of the Japanese government. Kodak argued that the
conspiracy involved the denial to Kodak of access to Japanese distributors who could
place its products in speciality photography shops and general stores. It contended
that a variety of rules regulating advertising and terms of trade, including discounts
and other promotional strategies, and the Japanese "Large Stores" Law, which gave
small shops an effective veto over the opening up of department stores, worked to
protect the entrenched distribution networks enjoyed by Fuji and Konica. These
rules, according to Kodak, kept it from offering incentives to distributors to lure them
away from its competitors or from developing new outlets for its products in high
volume stores. Since the days of the Bush Administration, Kodak had put pressure on
the United States to invoke Section 301 to coerce Japan into providing more support
for film importers. The Clinton Administration decided to proceed through the
WTO instead.
The U.S. government framed its attack on Japanese practice principally in terms
of the "nonviolation" prong of GATT Article XXIII(1)(b). Under that provision, a
WTO member's application of any governmental measure that nullifies or impairs a
benefit enjoyed by another member as a result of the GATT justifies relief, whether
or not the member's measure violates any provision of the GATT. The GATT, in
other words, does more than impose a set of positive rules of conduct. It also obligates
its members to deal with each other in a manner that does not frustrate legitimate
expectations formed in the process of GATT bargaining. In the Kodak dispute, Japan
had successively reduced its duties on photographic film and paper through a series of
GATT negotiating rounds. The United States had every right to expect that the
lower tariffs would lead to higher levels of imports. But, the United States argued,
Japan had undermined its concession by impairing the ability of importers to compete
on an equal footing with domestic producers. In addition, the United States

Vo 1910.1
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maintained that Japan had violated several GATT provisions, including the
obligations under Article III not to discriminate against imported products and under
Article X to maintain a transparent system of import controls.
A GATT panel ruled that the United States had failed to establish a link
between the laws and administrative actions to which it objected and Kodak's inability
to dent the Japanese market. The panel determined that some of the actions did not
constitute government "measures" at all, but rather private sector advisory bodies with
no direct lawmaking ability. The rest did not dearly prevent Kodak from establishing
effective distribution networks. For essentially the same reasons, the panel found that
Japan had not discriminated against imported goods. Finally, the panel determined
that the devolution of authority to apply various "fair trade" laws to local
governmental bodies did not mean that the Japanese system lacked transparency. The
local bodies did not have clear standards or an obligation to explain their decisions,
but the existence of an administrative supervisory structure provided an adequate
safeguard against arbitrary enforcement. 5
The most interesting aspect of the panel opinion is its refusal to impute an
inherent potential for anticompetitive shenanigans to collaborative relationships
between domestic industry and government. Kodak, one might argue, had made a
prima facie case for the existence of trade barriers by establishing a result, an
opportunity, and a motive. It had met with otherwise unaccountable resistance to its
product; the Japanese producers and the government participated in various formal
and informal advisory councils; and the producers and the government had a clear
incentive to block the sales of foreign goods, which would result in higher profits for
producers and greater rewards to politicians. Relationships by their nature rely on the
tacit as much as the specified, and we should not expect parties engaged in a
conspiracy in restraint of trade to spell out how they plan to harm their rivals or to
leave a convincing paper trail.
On the other hand, plenty of benign reasons exist for domestic producers and the
government to cooperate. The government needs to know about misbehavior by
importers, such as theft of intellectual property or other unfair trade practices;
regulatory objectives require reconciliation with industry practice and objectives; and
the government cannot develop its trade policy without reliable information about the
impact of imports on domestic producers. The basic question is one of credibility and
presumption: should an adjudicator enforcing competition rules assume that all
cooperation amounts to collusion, or should it require something more before
intervening?
By way of contrast to the WTO panel's approach, consider the Supreme Court's
methodology in Matsusbita Electric IndustrialCo v Zenith Radio Corp, the most important
modern case dealing with the intersection of U.S. trade and competition policy. 16 The

is. PhotographicFilm, WT/DS44/R (cited in note 6).
16. Matsusbita Electric IndustrialCo v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574, 582 (1986).
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Court confronted a claim that Japanese producers of consumer electronic products,
under the guidance of the Japanese government, conspired in a predatory pricing
scheme designed to wipe out their U.S. competitors in the U.S. market. The Court
refused to make the logical leap that the capture of a large share of the U.S. market
resulted from anticompetitive collusion, because it found the likelihood of a successful
predatory pricing conspiracy too slight. It declared, "courts should not permit fact
finders to infer conspiracies when such inferences are implausible, because the effect of
such practices is often to deter procompetitive conduct."'7 To illustrate this point, the
Court distinguished between a conspiracy to raise prices and one to lower them. The
former accords with normal expectations about producer behavior and therefore has
inherent plausibility; the latter does not. Matsusbita's negative inference, then, is that it
should be easier to presume the existence of a conspiracy when one finds opportunity
and results consistent with price-increasing collusion, even where direct evidence of
the conspiracy's existence cannot be found.
Kodak's story about Fuji, Konica, and the Japanese government had at its root
price-increasing strategies. Yet the WTO panel did not apply anything like
Matsusbita's negative inference, and instead insisted that the United States produce the
kind of evidence that a reasonably well-run cartel normally should succeed in hiding.
Generalizing a bit, the panel indicated a willingness to let formalism obscure
arrangements that operate to undermine the liberal norms underpinning the GATT
system. By requiring specific evidence of anticompetitive collusion between
government and industry-and not simply relying on opportunity, motive and
result-it signaled a tolerance of protectionist policies that depend on relationships
rather than positive laws.
The panel's conclusion implies something about the bargaining theory that
underlies the GATT system. It suggests that the parties who created the GATT
assumed a default norm of protection. Governments that hold themselves out as
improving the conditions for trade must honor their explicit commitments, but they
will not be treated as surrendering any more of their right to protect their producers
than the terms of the bargain specifies. Backsliding undermines the system only if it is
obvious, as when a government grants subsidies to domestic producers that offsets the
ability of importers to compete on price. Governments that obstruct and obfuscate
but avoid confrontation act within the scope of prerogatives reserved in the GATT
bargaining process.
This willingness to look the other way when a government tacitly undermines its
GATT obligations works particularly to the disadvantage of the United States.
Lacking as it does a strong sense of historical or cultural continuity, the United States
has a somewhat harder time working out implicit understandings in its public life. As
a result, political conflict in the United States tends to find its resolution through
17. Id at 593.
18. See, for example, European Economic Community-Payments andSubsidies Paid to Processorsand Producers
of Oilseeds andRelated Animal-feed Proteins, 37S GATT BISD 86 (1990).
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explicit, law-like instruments to a greater extent than occurs in most other countries.
There is much to be said for this tendency towards openness, but it constitutes a
drawback in a world where open actions come under international scrutiny and
hidden ones do not. The larger message of the photographic film and paper dispute,
then, is that WTO oversight will tend to impose a greater burden on U.S. policy
choices than on those of other countries.
InternationalTax Regimes

C.

As the global dimension of the economy grows, the ability of governments to
coordinate tax policy so as to frustrate these strategies increases in importance. We
have entered into something of an arms race, with governments seeking to prevent
revenues from fleeing as firms and persons explore new ways of shifting the incidents
of taxation to low-tax jurisdictions. The stakes are great. Without a secure source of
revenue, the ability of government to carry out a wide range of projects, and especially
to redistribute wealth, diminishes. 9
In the most general terms, modern governments mix consumption and income
taxation to stoke their revenues. Income taxes fall on owners of production inputs
(capital and labor) and lend themselves to a progressive rate structure. Consumption
taxes exempt savings and become unwieldy unless they employ a flat rate structure.
High income taxes drive away capital and production operations, to the extent either
is mobile. High consumption taxes affect the place where people make their
purchases, but only to the extent that purchased goods avoid customs controls.
The normal rule for allocating income tax revenues among several jurisdictions is
that "source' countries (the place where the income is generated, using customary
sourcing rules) have first bite at taxing income, with residual power to tax in the
country where the taxpayer resides (in the case of corporations, the place of
incorporation). What complicates this system almost to the point of collapse is the
ability of integrated firms to create foreign subsidiaries, which normally pay no income
tax in their parents'jurisdictions, and to set the price of intra-firm transactions so as to
shift income among jurisdictions. Tax authorities have developed an elaborate system
of "transfer-pricing rules" to constrain this strategy, but these entail great
administration problems. The alternative strategy involves imputing the subsidiary's
income to the parent through the device of a "deemed dividend," that is, a constructive
dividend of the subsidiary's net income to its parent.
Alone among the large economies, the United States relies largely on the income
tax for its national revenue base. U.S. exporters thus face a dilemma. Their customers
will pay a consumption tax wherever their goods end up, and the exporters will pay an
income tax on profits from their U.S. activities. A conventional means for reducing
the U.S. tax involves setting up an overseas sales subsidiary. As a foreign corporation,
19.

See Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Constraints on Governments in a Global Economy, 9 Const Pol
Econ 171,174-75 (1998).
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the subsidiary would pay no income tax unless and until it repatriates dividends to its
U.S. parent. Assuming that the parent incorporates the sales subsidiary in a low
income-tax jurisdiction, the total amount of income subject to any significant income
tax would be limited to the value created by making, as opposed to merchandising, the
goods.
But overseas sales corporations present an inherent problem. The parent has
every reason to underprice the goods it transfers to the subsidiary so as to avoid U.S.
taxes and to exaggerate income in the low-tax home of the subsidiary. Transferpricing rules, which impose on related parties an obligation to report transactions as if
unrelated parties had negotiated their terms at arms length, can check this practice but
do not solve the problem, both because they generate high administrative costs and
because they fail to reflect rapid price increases due to inflation or spikes in demand
for the goods in question. Excessive enforcement of the transfer-pricing rules also may
encourage firms to shift production offshore, causing both tax and job losses to the
United States. In a limited set of circumstances U.S. tax law obviates all these issues
by deeming a dividend from the foreign subsidiary to the parent. But Subpart F of the
Internal Revenue Code, which accomplishes this result, is horrendously complex and
difficult to apply predictably.' Moreover, Subpart F does not solve the problem of the
firm that chooses completely to expatriate itself by moving its operations offshore.
In 1969, Congress created a special tax status for "domestic international sales
corporations" (DISCs). This changes allowed exporters to set up domestic
subsidiaries (the DISC) which enjoyed some tax deferral on income from export sales.
The European Economic Community (a predecessor to the EU) challenged this
system, and a GATT panel held that it violated the GATT prohibition on export
subsidies. The United States resisted adoption of the panel report for five years. It
withdrew its objection only in 1981, when the GATT Council issued a declaration
noting inter alia, that "in general, economic processes (including transactions
involving exported goods) located outside the territorial limits of the exporting
country need not be subject to taxation by the exporting country and should not be
regarded as export activities in terms of Article XVI:4 of the General Agreement.""
Armed with what it thought was a binding interpretation of the GATT, the Reagan
Administration in 1984 procured the enactment of legislation on Foreign Sales
Corporations (FSCs) to supersede the DISC system. Unlike a DISC, a FSC had to
have an adequate foreign presence as defined in Section 922 of the Internal Revenue
Code. As was the case with DISCs, a FSC had a choice among several sets of transferpricing rules and could defer tax on a portion of its income, the precise fraction
depending on which transfer-pricing rules the FSC used.' The net effect of the rules
is to mimic what happens under a consumption tax: revenue from export sales does
20.
21.
22.

IRC §§ 951-64.
United States Tax Legislation (DISC), 285 GATT BISD 114 (1981).
Subpart: F did not apply to FSCs, and the exempt portion of the FSC's income could be transferred

to its U.S. parent free of tax. IRC §§ 245(c), 921-27, 951(e).
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not enter into the tax base.
However formalistic this response to the subsidy issue might appear, it was not
challenged until 1997. At that time, the EU attacked the FSC system as inconsistent
with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), one of the
Uruguay Round instruments that elaborated on the meaning of GATT Article XVI.
A panel ruled in favor of the European Union, and the Appellate Body affirmed.'
The Appellate Body maintained that the appropriate test for determining
whether a tax rule constituted a prohibited export subsidy is whether a taxpayer
avoids otherwise applicable rules because of its status as an exporter. "A member, in
principle, has the sovereign authority to tax any particular categories of revenue it
wishes. It is also free not to tax any particular categories of revenues. But, in both
instances, the Member must respect its WTO obligations." 24 Because the FSC regime
produces lower taxes for those taxpayers who elect this treatment than otherwise
would have been due, holding everything constant but the FSC election, it violated the
SCM.
The main thrust of the U.S. defense rested on the 1981 interpretation of tax
rules as subsidies, which, it maintained, found its way into the SCM through a
footnote tracking the interpretation's language. The Appellate Body denied either that
that SCM footnote represented a ratification of the FSC regime, or that that 1981
interpretation applied of its own force to the Uruguay Round Agreements. "[T]he
issue in dispute is whether, having decided to tax a particular category of foreignsource income, the United States is permitted to carve out an export contingent
exemption from the category of foreign-source income that is taxed under its other
rules of taxation."' The answer, in the view of the Appellate Body, was no.
At first blush, this conclusion may seem self-evident. The FSC rules completely
exclude from tax a portion of income generated by export sales. This outcome goes
beyond the reach of the 1981 interpretation, which recognized only the case for
deferring a tax on offshore income pending its repatriation. But as a practical matter
the distinction between deferral and complete exemption disappears the longer a firm
reinvests its profits offshore, as a successful FSC typically will do. Moreover, the
exemption of dividends based on foreign sales income carries with it the loss of the
foreign tax credit." Nor is the exemption from Subpart F's deemed-dividend rules
that an FSC enjoys all that remarkable. Subpart F applies in limited circumstances
and with extremely complex exceptions and qualifications. Ingenious (and expensive)
tax planning normally suffices to take most active foreign subsidiaries out of its scope.

23. World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations,"WT/DS108/R (Oct 8, 1999); World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate
Body, United States- Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations, " WT/DS 108/AB/R (Feb 24,
24.

2000).
Appellate Body Report para 90.

25.

Id at para 99.

26. IRC § 901(h).
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In most cases the FSC exemption operates more as a safe harbor, ensuring an
outcome that it probably would obtain in any event at a lower administrative cost.
The real reason why FSCs have become so popular in the last decade may involve
reduction of tax compliance costs, rather than direct tax savings. The failure of the
Internal Revenue Service to come up with clear and workable transfer-pricing rules
had led to considerable litigation as well as other forms of dispute resolution; by some
estimates more than two-thirds of the dollar amount of all tax liabilities currently in
dispute involve transfer-pricing issues.2 FSCs have access to special rules that elevate
precision over accuracy. These may exaggerate offshore income, but they also avoid
the tremendous difficulties of working with the normal arm's length method. They
reduce uncertainty as well as accounting costs, benefits that may exceed actual tax
savings.
If my speculation about the incentives generated by FSCs is correct, then the
interesting problem becomes the breadth of the Appellate Body's holding. It suggests
that any difference in the treatment of exporters and other taxpayers may violate the
SCM. This principle might extend even to a regime that did nothing but make special
"safe harbor" transfer-pricing rules available to exporters.28 The opinion stressed that
the combination of benefits accorded FSCs-the special transfer-pricing rules, the
exemption from Subpart F, the exclusion of dividends from income-constituted a
prohibited subsidy. Presumably, Congress could remove the least significant of these
qualities-perhaps the Subpart F exemption and the income exclusion-and pass
muster. But the panel's conclusion that differences in tax treatment between exporters
and others violates the SCM Agreement has broader implications. Once exporters
alone are allowed to elect a special status, it is plausible to assume, as the WTO panel
did, that firms will make the election only to save taxes. The alternative possibility,
that administrative and uncertainty costs largely motivate the election, cannot be
proved. If so, then any differences in tax rules that depend on exporting might conflict
with the SCM Agreement.
A broad principle that regarded any tax adjustments for exporters as suspect
would work particularly to the detriment of the United States. First, income taxes
have greater significance for U.S. revenues than for those of the other major economic
powers. As a result, such a principle has a larger impact on U.S. firms in terms of how
they structure their international activities than do comparable taxes on their foreign
competitors. Second, the United States generally would find it more difficult to rely
on informal practices and understandings as a way of alleviating the tax burden of its
taxpayers than would most other governments. As noted above, the nature of U.S.

27.

28.

For a fil discussion of the costs attendant in complying with transfer-pricing regimes generally, and
with the U.S. regime in particular, see Lorraine Eden, Taxing Multinationals: Transfer Pricing and
CorporateIncome Taxation in North America (Toronto 1998).
The panel declined to determine whether the FSC transfer-pricing rules, taken alone, constituted a
prohibited subsidy, and the Appellate Body also declined to address the issue. Appellate Body
Report at paras 172-73.
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society makes informal settlements difficult to maintain. Were the Internal Revenue
Service, for example, to develop a practice of settling transfer-pricing disputes with
exporters, but not others, on favorable terms, litigation and congressional scrutiny
would soon follow, with Freedom of Information Act releases fueling the fire. Most
other countries do not have such difficulties reaching and keeping tacit agreements.
The Appellate Body decision raises another, broader issue. The determination
that the 1981 interpretation did not constitute binding authority in the post-Uruguay
Round world, either of its own force or through the SCM footnote, has unsettling
implications. What other understandings worked out in the 47-year history of the
GATT failed to survive the Uruguay Round? What deals that the United States
believed it had made have come undone?
To be sure, there was nothing exceptional about the Appellate Bodys method
for putting aside the 1981 interpretation. The Agreement creating the WTO
addressed the issue of GATT precedent and made clear that interpretive decisions by
the Council, including the adoption or modification of panel reports, did not have the
same status as fully negotiated agreements achieved through extended multilateral
bargaining. All the same, the Appellate Body did not have to give the earlier
agreement such short shrift. It easily could have looked at the sequence of eventsadoption of the interpretation, enactment of the FSC legislation, a decade of silenceas informative as to what the SCM Agreement meant to embrace. Its failure to do so
suggests a broader agenda for the dispute resolution process.
The Appellate Bodys approach, which treats the 1994 Agreements as providing
a clean slate, gives the tribunals greater freedom to develop interpretations that accord
with their own preferences, rather than compelling adherence to the status quo. This
strategy promotes legal innovation over stability, and the discretionary authority of
the WTO dispute resolution process over the autonomy of WTO members.
D.

General Observations

In the five years that the WTO dispute resolution process has been up and
running, the United States has faced setbacks in three important policy arenas. The
WTO rejected its efforts to take the lead in protecting migrating wildlife, refused to
challenge opaque relationships between bureaucracies and domestic producers that
may harm its exporters, and thwarted its attempt to reconcile its income tax with a
consumption-tax world. These defeats complicate U.S. efforts to address problems
affecting many billions of dollars in trade, investment and revenues. They also suggest
serious limitations on the ability of the United States to shape the international
environment.
The way the WTO organs have justified their decisions may have even greater
significance. They talk as if they have lawmaking power, in the same sense that a
common law court creates, and does not just interpret, norms of conduct. Moreover,
they exercise their discretionary authority in a manner that expands their power at the
expense of the United States. By insisting on a tight fit between trade sanctions and
their professed objectives, the organs reduce the ability of the United States to use
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economic rewards and punishments to maximize its overall influence. By refusing to
assume that industry-government entanglements have an inherent potential for abuse,
they maximize their scrutiny of U.S. regulation in relation to that of other major
economic powers. And by treating all compromises worked out within the GATT
structure, but not memorialized in fully negotiated multilateral instruments, as
nonbinding, they increase their capacity to alter the status quo in favor of expanding
their own powers.
Or so it seems. Up until this point, my analysis has assumed that the opinions of
the Appellate Body and the WTO panels are meaningful, in the sense that the
arguments used to justify the results provide valuable information about how these
organs will act in the future. When it comes to domestic courts, we take this
assumption for granted. But international organs operate in a different legal culture,
often with diminished expectations and less direct scrutiny. The presumptuousness of
their rhetoric may mask a sense of deep irrelevance. We now must consider whether it
makes sense to take the WTO dispute resolution process seriously.
III. DOES THE WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION CONSTRAIN U.S. POLICY?
The WTO dispute resolution process functions as a significant constraint on

U.S. policy if, and only if, two things are true: the WTO has sufficient authority to
influence what the United States does, and it exercises this authority to bring about
choices that the U.S. would prefer not to make. I explore these issues separately.
A.

Does the WTO Matter?

The ultimate cost of disregarding WTO pronouncements is retaliatory sanctions
that, if pressed far enough, can amount to economic ostracization. A superpower cares
about what the WTO says only if the economic consequences of defiance would
significantly compromise its interests. But what does the WTO embody to the
United States?
First, money matters. A large and growing portion of the U.S. economy
comprises international commerce. In 1999, the most recent year for which data
exists, the United States exported over $ 978 billion in goods and services and
imported over $ 1.2 trillion, against a gross domestic product of over $ 9.1 trillion.29 Of
course, a significant portion of these international flows of value either falls entirely
outside WTO purview (for example, arms sales) or will come under substantial
WTO discipline only some time in the coming decade (agriculture, textiles, most
services industries). But even these transactions have a link to the WTO system, both
because they remain hostage to any trade war that might occur in the absence of a
regime promoting international economic peace and because their good health to
some extent depends on the robustness of the economic sectors that the WTO
29.
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directly supervises. So one fairly may argue that products affected by the WTO
system have an enormous impact on the U.S. economy, and that a sudden disruption
of these flows would have dramatic political, social and cultural, and economic
consequences.
Second, expectations about future behavior that rest on past actions matter.
Growth of the global economy depends on perceptions about stable conditions,
including tariffs and other trade regulations. The overall sense of predictability and
calm that the GATT/WTO system has engendered bolsters the confidence of people
entering into international transactions. Take away this confidence, and serious
consequences ensue. Governments will replace trust with suspicion, lowering the
threshold for economic conflict. Private actors will shy away from international
transactions, resulting in missed opportunities and diminished growth.
One might argue that the forces that shape the global economy operate
independently of institutions such as the WTO. A strict materialist should regard the
WTO as an epiphenomenon that has significance, if at all, only as an expression of the
underlying technological and economic base that drives market and production
relations. But rigorous adherence to this position also would preclude any serious
interest in U.S. political institutions except to the extent they reveal, like shadows on
the wall of a cave, the base. A more interesting question is whether the critical
forces-whatever they are-enjoy greater autonomy from the WTO than from the
aggregate of choices made at the national level.
A theoretical argument for taking the WTO seriously draws on both political
economy and institutional economics. Classical liberal theory argues that overall
welfare is maximized when nations refuse to protect, even if their exporters face trade
barriers elsewhere, because gains to consumer welfare from greater competition exceed
the losses that domestic producers suffer from import competition. In practice,
however, consumer welfare seldom carries the day by itself, because domestic
producers tend to have lower organizational costs and therefore wield
disproportionate influence in the political process. Bargaining among states that trades
concessions in the direction of liberalizing trade allows individual governments to pit
exporting domestic producers against those who fear import competition. The
availability of such bargains therefore shifts the political consensus toward results that
tend to benefit consumers. The choice of institutional structure in turn can lower the
transaction costs associated with this bargaining by standardizing terms, organizing
information flows among parties, and decreasing the need to take precautions against
defection. A robust international trade organization can increase the credibility of
promises that interested groups within individual nations would wish to see made and
honored.
There is empirical evidence to suggest that this theoretical explanation for the
GATT/WTO system has some explanatory power. At the grossest level, the GATT,
succeeded by the WTO, has organized a deep and widespread cut in tariffs on a
worldwide basis and has impeded most efforts to erect other kinds of trade barriers.
The system has imposed its discipline on reluctant nations without provoking
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outright defiance. The results of the WTO dispute resolution process in particular
provide good evidence of the system's efficacy. Of the twenty-three Appellate Body or
panel decisions that the WTO had adopted formally as of the end of 1999, fifteen
produced either outright compliance or commitments to comply, two resulted in the
imposition of trade sanctions in place of compliance, and six remain in negotiation.
Rich countries have complied at about the same rate as poor ones." For most then, it
seems that a membership's benefits outweigh its costs. To be sure, this may reflect low
costs rather than high benefits. Still, whatever the reason, membership has boomed
from twenty-three in 1947 to 135 today, with others (for example, China and Russia)
clamoring to join. It may not have the direct clout of the IMF or the World Bank,
which can cut off a country's access to both public and private capital. But its seal of
approval seems to carry considerable weight.
Moreover, the United States has conducted itself over the years in a manner that
manifests some concern about the GATT/WTO system. In particular, it has shown
itself willing to comply with adverse rulings. I mentioned earlier the DISC dispute,
which produced amendments to the Internal Revenue Code. Also noteworthy is the
first decision of the Appellate Body, which attacked U.S. environmental regulations
dealing with the content of imported gasoline." In response, the Environmental
Protection Agency withdrew the measure and replaced it with one that the importers
deemed acceptable. In no instance has the United States greeted a loss in WTO
dispute resolution with intransigence.
In sum, a strong case exists for the proposition that the United States much
prefers a world with the WTO to one without it, and as a corollary that the United
States would bear substantial costs before it would abandon the WTO system. This
claim does not depend on the argument that the GATT constitutes a body of
international obligations, and that these obligations in and of themselves create a
moral commitment. Rather, it maintains that the United States has a significant
material stake in the WTO's good health, and that the risks associated with
disruption of the WTO system provide a strong disincentive for U.S. noncompliance
in the face of WTO opposition to its policies.
B. Does the WTO Oppose the United States?
It is one thing to say that the WTO has the capacity to oppose the United
States, and another to claim that it does so in any systematic fashion. Perhaps the
United States exercises sufficient control over the WTO to marginalize its ability to
thwart U.S. policy. Even if the exit option-dropping out of the WTO altogether or
30.
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simply ignoring its mandate-may pose too high a cost, the United States may have a
sufficiently strong voice in WTO decision-making to preclude any serious conflicts.
Seen with a broad ideological lens, the WTO serves as an instrument of U.S.
policy, not as a check on U.S. ambitions. What the WTO stands for corresponds, in
some deep sense, to core U.S. political and economic values. Opening trade,
dismantling restrictions on foreign investors and *increasing transparency in
governmental economic regulation promotes a global business culture in which the
United States, with its market traditions, may enjoy an inherent advantage.
Hobsbawm's account reflects this perspective. The GATT/WTO system advances
U.S. interests in that it organizes international life in a manner that contradicts the
Marxist-Leninist agenda.
But this argument works only at the grossest level of generalization. In a world
where Soviet-style socialism and U.S.-style capitalism competed as sources of
inspiration for political, social and economic policy, one might get away with
categories that conflate all efforts to promote traditional liberalism with U.S.
interests.3 But in today's world of ideological exhaustion, an opposition between open
politics and market-based economics, on the one hand, and state leadership in all areas
of social life, on the other hand, seems unhelpful. We cannot usefully talk of a
hegemony that is defined only by the absence of totalitarianism. Rather, it becomes
more interesting to look for variations in approaches to less grand issues, all occurring
against a background of mixed public and private economic spheres and broadly, if
incompletely, accountable governments.
Here we again can turn to political economy and institutional economics for a
prediction about why the WTO might operate at cross purposes with the United
States. The WTO may generally produce outcomes desirable to its influential
members. But the very institutional structure that produces these desirable outcomes
also may provide a foundation for resistance to particular U.S. objectives. Because the
WTO parties cannot fully specify how the organization should operate, WTO
officials have some freedom to pursue their own interests, whether material (shirking,
rewarding past supporters, building future careers) or ideological. The governments
also have some selfish incentives (future advancement in both public and private life)
to respond to focused pressure from well organized and homogenous groups. As long
as the costs of such self-interested behavior are less than the costs of imposing greater
constraints on the WTO officials-the latter costs including both efforts to monitor
the officials and opportunities foregone as a result of overly definite constraints on
their behavior-the WTO will take positions that even its most powerful members
will regret.

33. The operative word is "might." For a critique of the conventional depiction of the Cold War as a
clash between capitalism and socialism, see Paul B. Stephan, The Fall-Understandingthe Collapse of
the Soviet System, 29 Suffolk U L Rev 17 (1995). For a similar perspective by a Russian scholar, see

Sergey Vadimovich Kortunov, Kbolodnya voyna: paradoksy odnoy strategii, [The Cold War The Paradox
of One Strategy], 8 Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn [Ind Aift] 23 (1998).
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How realistic is this speculation? We know that the United States would not like
to have the WTO turn against it. But it is at least as true that the WTO would not
like to face the wrath of the United States. A falling out would cause the United
States great economic pain, but it would bring into question the continued existence
of the WTO. Backed by U.S. economic power, the WTO has power and prestige;
stripped of U.S. support, it would do well to match the hollow shell of the League of
Nations. Does the threat of mutually assured destruction ensure that the WTO will
not pose any serious obstacle to U.S. policy?
This article establishes that the WTO dispute resolution process has reached
outcomes that conflict with U.S. objectives. Not only have the cases impeded U.S.
efforts to promote environmental goals, to extend its model of open competition based
on consumer welfare to other countries, and to allow its progressive income tax to
survive in a consumption-tax world, but they have intimated at broader constraints
that hem in a wide array of unilateral tools that the U.S. needs to exercise strong
international influence.
But what do these cases really prove. Perhaps the shrimp dispute was not about
environmental policy, but only about turtle protection; the photographic film dispute
not about competition policy but only about Kodak; and, the FSC dispute not about
international tax policy, but only about FSCs. One can minimize the significance of
these cases by isolating the specific issues in dispute from the broader questions that
they implicate. This isolation requires only a separation of result from reasoning. The
WTO organs may write lengthy opinions justifying what they do, but that does not
mean that the justifications count for much. We should not confuse the common law
form of these decisions with their actual instrumental function. If neither the authors
of these opinions nor their audience intends to regard them as constraints on future
actions, then they do nothing more than announce outcomes of particular
controversies.
Both theoretical arguments and empirical observations provide at least soft
support for the notion that the justifications, and not just the actions, of the dispute
resolution organs matter. We might not be in a position to regard the WTO opinions
as canonical interpretations of WTO law, but the likelihood that they provide useful
information about how future dispute resolution organs will act is sufficiently high to
justify treating the opinions, and not just the rulings, as imposing some constraints on
the conduct of WTO members, and especially on the United States.
The theoretical argument follows logically from the claim made above that the
WTO system serves as a valuable cost-reducing solution to a collective action
problem. If the institution creates value, then the generation of information about its
likely future behavior also should be valuable. The dispute resolution organs optimize
the benefits of the process they administer by providing reliable indications of how
they would act in situations analogous to those before them, and then acting in
accordance with those indications. The members can respond to this information in
ways that minimize the cost of complying with the rules that the organs will impose.
I do not mean to suggest that the organs have an incentive always to produce
V-QO1 Wo0.1
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more information about their future actions. A tradeoff necessarily exists between (a)
specifying future conduct; and (b) keeping future options open. Decision-makers are
likely to optimize the value of their services when they provide substantial information
about their future choices but do not adhere rigidly to every implication of what they
say. And in an evolutionary environment with competition among different
institutional arrangements, one would expect that the arrangement that best
optimizes this value will prevail.
This theoretical argument rebuts the claim that the opinions accompanying
WTO dispute resolution decisions are empty charades, but it does not predict any
particular level of adherence to arguments advanced in prior opinions. More precisely,
it justifies "some' adherence but not "complete' adherence without specifying what
"some' means. To glean more knowledge about the actual value of the opinions in the
real world, we need to look at how the organs and the WTO members have behaved.
A review of both the Appellate Body and panel opinions suggests a serious effort
to develop a coherent jurisprudence. The Appellate Bodys decisions generally seek to
explain outcomes in terms of consistency with prior decisions. Over the short period
that the Appellate Body has functioned, it has managed to avoid any serious elisions
or contradictions. The internal evidence, then, supports the proposition that WTO
opinions have meaning that extends beyond their results.
The external evidence of how the WTO parties respond to the broader messages
contained in dispute resolution opinions necessarily is ambiguous, given the short
period of time involved. As of February 6, 2000, WTO members had initiated WTO
dispute resolution in 147 distinct matters, of which eighty-five resulted in the
formation of panels; the remaining sixty-two disputes were in negotiation pending
commencement of the formal process. Of the eighty-five matters that reached the
stage of forming a panel, twenty-one were pending at the end of 1999, thirty-one
ended in a settlement before panel resolution of the matter, and thirty-three resulted
in a decision by at least one WTO organ. Of the thirty-three cases that produced a
decision, twenty-eight gave at least some relief to the members attacking a country's
laws or practices. 4
In an adjudication system with a well-developed and credible track record and
substantial transaction costs, one normally should expect the number of settlements to
exceed the number of decided cases by a significant margin and a roughly equal
number of decisions in favor of complainants and of defendants." The figures here do
not conform to that prediction. The level of settlement is substantial, but lower than
one would expect in a mature system, while the ratio of decisions in favor of
complainants to those in favor of defendants is remarkably high.
Two explanations for these discrepancies suggest themselves. Either the parties
34. Overview of the State-of-play of WTO Disputes <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bu1etin.htm>
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have relatively low transaction costs, or they cannot predict accurately how the WTO
organs will decide. Low transaction costs might explain why defendants do not settle
even when they have weak cases. They may find changes in the status quo easier to sell
to domestic constituencies if those changes come in the form of compliance with a
WTO order. On the other hand, that the parties settle a significant number of cases
suggests that they do not regard the WTO dispute resolution process as totally
random and therefore completely unpredictable. What we have is weak evidence
indicating that governments have some ability to predict the outcome of WTO
dispute resolution. As the process matures and a greater body of opinion-based
information builds up, we should develop a better sense of whether WTO members
take seriously the WTO opinions.
The last point suggests yet another argument for minimizing the significance of
the U.S. defeats in the WTO. Member governments generally, and the U.S. executive
branch in particular, may send disputes to the WTO organs as a way of placating and
distracting influential domestic constituencies. The Kodak dispute might be a case in
point. There an important producer had exerted pressure on both the Bush and
Clinton administrations to force Japan to open up its market. Viewed from the
perspective of overall national interest, no measure against Japan may have seemed
appropriate, especially with Japan's economy in a serious recession and significant
political upheaval under way. The Clinton administration might have used the WTO
to pull a bait-and-switch on Kodak, taking up its cause but also sending it down to
defeat in a forum it knew to be hostile to the kind of claim that the case presented.
I previously have argued that international institutions such as the WTO
produce some displacement in discretionary authority from parliaments to
executives.' To the extent WTO dispute resolution conforms to this pattern, we
might interpret signs of its aggrandizement as masking that of the executive branch in
relation to Congress, and not as a real loss of national influence. But it also is possible
that real growth in discretionary authority occurs in favor of the WTO. First, to the
extent the executive branch derives a benefit from WTO dispute resolution through
increased leverage over Congress, it might more readily tolerate assertions of
independence by the WTO organs. It would see a loss of authority to the WTO as
the price of strengthening its hand with Congress. Second, it seems implausible that
private parties with a stake in WTO dispute resolution cannot monitor how the
government performs. Especially when a single firm has an interest in a matter, as
with Kodak, the ability of the government to shirk should be limited.
Where does this leave us? There are reasons to believe that the shrimp, Kodak
and FSC decisions might have broad implications, and that those implications would
significantly limit the ability of the United States to extend its international influence
through economic measures. The opinions suggest that a wide range of economic
incentives that the United States would like to use to reward its friends and harass its
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adversaries may violate the Uruguay Round Agreements, that other nations may use
the relatively strong U.S. tendency toward formalism and transparency in public
decision-making to their advantage, and that the WTO enjoys a flexibility to
withdraw from or modify its commitments to the United States that is not
symmetrical with U.S. ability to renegotiate its obligations to the organization.
To be sure, the case is not compelling and must await further evidence. But this
uncertainty itself acts as a check on U.S. behavior. The United States does not want
to see the WTO system come tumbling down. It cannot know that the WTO organs
will not throw down the gauntlet, and should shy away from choices that run a
substantial risk of a destructive confrontation.

IV. REGIMES AND HEGEMONY
As the world's only remaining superpower, the United States seems to stand
astride the world. Its military power, technological success and economic exuberance
serve both as an argument for the U.S. system as a model for other nations and as a
means of coaxing balky states to do what the United States desires. If all this power
and success does not amount to hegemony, what does?
But this picture of the American colossus assumes that international influence is
a force that only nation states exercise on other nation states. A paradoxical effect of
the Cold War was the emergence of powerful international organizations undertaking
types of economic coordination that superseded state-to-state management of these
issues." The United States had promoted these bodies as a response to the Soviet
challenge, but over time they acquired an agenda of their own and the means to
implement it. Their success in grappling with the international economy gave these
institutions-the IMF and the World Bank, as much as the GATT-functions that
are independent of their original purpose. My concededly casual empiricism bears out
what political economy and institutional economics predicts-they now exercise an
influence of their own that cabins what even the most powerful nation can do. A focus
on state-to-state relations misses this crucial point.
I do not mean to overstate my argument. Shifts in discretionary authority and
the capacity to lay down and enforce rules of conduct do not translate into complete
displacement. The international economic institutions do not constitute a world
government or anything like it. Analogies to the role of the EU in governing Europe
would be, to put it mildly, far-fetched. The United States still matters, even if its place
in the world economy is less than hegemonic.
Nor do my observations extend beyond the economic sphere. In particular, I do
not mean to suggest anything about questions of international security. Thus the
claims I make about the growing authority of international institutions do not extend
to NATO or the OSCE, much less the United Nations. Concomitantly, I do not
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seek to untangle the intricate and complex ties between security and economic issues. I
believe that money matters a great deal, in international relations as in many other
fields, but I cannot specify how much.
I also do not intend to advance a normative judgement as to the value of the
WTO and comparable institutions as substitutes for unconstrained U.S. hegemony.
In other work I argued that international institutions come with costs as well as
benefits, and that we should not always assume that the best solution to an
international coordination problem is a robust international organization. 3 The
drawbacks of U.S. hegemony also should be apparent. However wonderful the open
culture and traditions of freedom that (we like to think) characterize the United
States, nothing we know about human society suggests that one size comfortably fits
all. Nor does complete international anarchy, where collective action problems go
unsolved, attract. The specification of arguments in favor of particular mixes of these
international structures lies far beyond my ambition.
Rather, I assert that as a positive matter one particular international
institution-the WTO and its dispute resolution process-stands in the way of U.S.
hegemony with respect to global economic matters. This claim is helpful, given the
persistent tendency of many people, especially Americans, to assume that the United
States bears full responsibility for whatever goes on in the world. At least in one
narrow but important area of international relations-commercial relations across
borders-there exists a locus of both administration and politics elsewhere than in
Washington. When it comes to trade, the United States is not the world's sheriff, but
an occupant of a structure that it helped to build. Whether it has built a castle or
dungeon remains to be seen.
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